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“THIS IS GHANAIAN TERRITORY!”  
LAND CONFLICTS IN TRANSNATIONAL LOCALITIES ON 
THE BURKINA FASO-GHANA BORDER 
Carola Lentz1
Abstract 
Traditional land rights in Dagara and Sisala societies in Burkina Faso and 
Ghana which were stateless in pre-colonial times are closely connected with 
the concept of earth-shrine parishes under the protection of a local land god 
and ideally under the control of the “first-comers” to the area. The earth 
priests perform regular sacrifices at the shrine and allocate land to later immi-
grants as well as the right to build houses and to bury their dead, often in ex-
change for gifts. The international border between Ghana and Burkina Faso, 
which was drawn up in 1898 and runs along the 11th parallel, often cuts across 
earth-shrine parishes. Particularly since the border demarcation exercise in the 
1970s, the spatial separation of the Sisala earth priests on one side of the bor-
der from the Dagara immigrants on the other side has given rise to intricate 
conflicts over land rights. The paper will present the history of one such con-
flict and look at the various land-related discourses – traditionalist, nationalist, 
and Christian – which the adversaries put forward in order to substantiate their 
claims.  
Résumé 
“THIS IS GHANAIAN TERRITORY!” LE DROIT FONCIER CONFLICTUEL DANS DES 
VILLAGES FRONTALIERS (BURKINA FASO – GHANA) - Le droit foncier tradition-
nel dans les sociétés Dagara et Sisala au Burkina Faso et au Ghana est 
étroitement lié à l’idée de territoires sous la protection d’un sanctuaire de la 
terre. Selon la norme, les sanctuaires sont sous la garde des “premiers-venus” 
dans cette région. Les chefs de terre font régulièrement des offrandes auprès 
du sanctuaire et ils ont le droit d’assigner des terres aux immigrés venus plus 
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tard et de leur donner la permission à construire des maisons et à enterrer leurs 
morts. La frontière internationale entre le Ghana et le Burkina Faso qui a été 
tracée en 1898 et qui est située sur le onzième parallèle croise souvent des ter-
ritoires sous la protection d’un sanctuaire de la terre. Particulièrement depuis 
l’accord et la démarcation frontalière des années 1970 la séparation spatiale 
des chefs de terre sisala sur une côté de la frontière et des immigrés dagara sur 
l’autre côté a donné lieu à des conflits complexes à propos du droit foncier. 
Cette étude démontre l’histoire d’un tel conflit et jette un regard sur les dif-
férents arguments relatifs au droit foncier – traditionalistes, nationalistes et 
Chrétiens – que les adversaires expriment afin de rendre leur demandes légi-
times.  
Introduction 
The following event took place in the early 1990s, on the shores of a small 
pond in Kyetuu, a village situated right on the international border between 
Ghana and Burkina Faso. The last border demarcation defined the pond as ly-
ing on Ghanaian territory. A few years before the event in question, the pond 
had been dug out with the help of heavy road-construction equipment. Until 
then, the pond used to dry up towards February or March; now, it contains 
water and plentiful fish almost throughout the year. The young men of Kyetuu 
and neighbouring Dagara villages on the Ghanaian side of the border have 
now acquired modern fishing nets and turned fishing into a continuous 
profitable individual enterprise – something quite different from the traditional 
yearly communal fishing activity. Close to the pond, but on the Burkina Faso 
side of the border, live the Sisala earth priests of Kyetuu. They regard the 
pond and the territory on which the Dagara have settled as their ancestral 
lands, and consider themselves the legitimate patrons of any fishing activity. 
When these Sisala tried to prevent the Dagara young men from fishing without 
their permission, a fierce battle developed. The Dagara are said to have 
pointed guns at the earth priests envoys and chased them away, shouting that 
Burkinabé citizens had no right to trespass or fish on Ghanaian territory. 
There are, of course, other versions of this event. What interests me here is 
the light which this conflict throws on the different concepts of boundaries and 
land rights that have developed in recent decades in the villages straddling the 
international border. Conventional views of colonial borders insist that they 
are divisive, arbitrarily drawn by the European powers and forced upon 
unwilling Africans. Recently, however, a number of historical and 
anthropological studies have pointed to the influence which local populations 
exert in the definition and implementation or subversion of the borders, often 
turning them into an important economic and political resource. Even though 
borders are decided and drawn up in the metropolitan centres, they have to be 
made locally. They therefore become privileged sites of interaction between   479
older local concepts of land rights and boundaries, and European ideas of 
lineal borders, territoriality and nation-states.2
It is this interaction of indigenous and European concepts of territoriality, 
boundaries and land rights that I wish to explore in this paper. The case of 
Kyetuu (and neighbouring villages) is particularly revealing because, in the 
pre-colonial period, the Dagara and Sisala were “stateless societies” with 
notions of territoriality quite different from the European, modern ones. In 
what follows, I will first sketch the development of the international border, 
make some remarks on local understandings of boundaries and outline the 
settlement history of Kyetuu. I shall then analyse the land- and border-related 
arguments which the adversaries in the fishing conflict put forward in order to 
substantiate their claims. I shall conclude with a brief consideration of the 
wider implications of the Kyetuu case for our understanding of the making of 
boundaries and perceptions of space in the West African savannah. 
The history of the international border 
The Anglo-French Convention of 1898 put an end to almost a decade of 
struggle for power in the Volta region, between the British and the French, 
whose changing alliances with Samori, Babatu and various local “strong men” 
had drawn the Black Volta region into a turmoil.3 The Black Volta and the 
11th parallel, running east of the Volta to Togoland, were agreed upon as the 
border between British and French colonial territory. It is the border along the 
11th parallel which interests me particularly here. 
In 1900 a first British-French boundary commission worked for eight 
months on the basic cartography and delimitation of this 300-km-long border 
and informed the local population which colonial power they now belonged 
to.4 A second commission in 1904 undertook the actual demarcation on the 
ground, by marking trees and setting up piles of stones at regular intervals. 
Both commissions were pragmatic enough to allow villagers to continue to use 
their hereditary resources of farmland, pasture and water on the other side of 
the border.5  
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In 1924–5, a third boundary commission restored the many boundary markers 
that had disappeared in the meantime. They decreed that compounds that were 
not satisfied with their allocation to one or other of the colonies were free to 
move, with bag and bagage, to the other side of the border within the next six 
months. A year later, the colonial governments attempted to suppress the 
continuing cross-border use of agricultural resources. But the attempt never 
got beyond the stage of making a detailed census of the monetary value of the 
resources which French “natives” used on British territory and vice versa.6
With the exception of the years of the Second World War, no further 
attempts at a more rigid control of movement across the border seem to have 
been made until the first fresh demarcation exercise after indepence, in the 
early 1970s. The course of the border was then corrected in a few places and, 
for the first time, concrete pillars were erected, about one kilometer apart from 
each other. For a number of years, Ghanaian border guards patrolled the area 
more actively in order to suppress drug trafficking and other kinds of 
smuggling, and many of my informants speak of this period as “the time when 
the border came”.7
None of the demarcation exercises took into account the indigenous 
institution of earth-shrine parishes on which land rights are customarily based 
in the Black Volta region. Earth-shrine parishes are territories believed to be 
under the protection of a local earth god. Ideally, they are under the control of 
the “first-comers” and their descendants, who perform regular sacrifices at the 
shrine and allocate land to later immigrants, often in exchange for substantial 
gifts. The “late-comers” also have to consult the earth priests before building 
houses or burying their dead. In earth-shrine parishes such as Kyetuu, which 
were divided by the international border along the 11th parallel, the earth 
priests usually continued to exercise their rights and duties across the border. 
This does not mean, however, that the local population was not aware of 
the new border. At least since the 1920s, if not earlier, people had clear ideas 
of the approximate course of the border and, more importantly, of the political 
allegiance of the compounds in its vicinity, although these ideas did not 
coincide fully with the official map.8 The reason for this awareness was the 
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fact that the border soon became an important political resource, used as a 
protection against colonial tax and forced labour requirements. 
How did the local population perceive the international border? I would 
argue that for many decades it was not understood in the way that the colonial 
officers saw it, that is, as a neatly drawn continuous line separating two 
territories, but rather as a zone of contact or buffer zone between two different 
spheres of influence and networks of power. A short explanation of local 
concepts of boundaries seems necessary here. When speaking of the 
international border, the Dagara and Sisala population usually resort to the 
respective French and English terms, “frontière” and “border”. Very rarely do 
they apply the terms turbogr (Dagara) and susubuo (Sisala), the only 
indigenous words for boundary. Turbogr and susubuo literally refer to a 
continuous line of holes or a ditch and are mainly applied to the bundaries 
between different fields. Within Dagara and Sisala settlements, fields owned 
by different lineages are usually marked off physically by a ditch, path or 
hedge of shrubs.9 While field boundaries are imagined as continuous lines, the 
nature of the “border” of earth-shrine parishes is much more difficult to 
define, and the term turbogr is used here only very occasionally. During the 
early phases of settlement in the area, when land was not scarce, the earth-
shrine parish was probably understood not as a flat homogenous territory, but 
as a vaguely defined field of ritual power, with a well-defined centre (the earth 
shrine) in the inhabited and regularly cultivated space and with concentric 
circles of influence, thinning out towards the uncultivated bush which 
separates the settlement from the neighbouring earth-shrine parishes. This 
bush was a zone of contact rather than a separating boundary, and intricrate 
agreements regulated the question of how to divide the prey of hunters who 
ventured into these zones. The concept was rather one of specific meetings 
points in the bush, marked by natural features or signs cut into trees, than 
lineal boundaries. However, when the settlements grew and the bush was 
cultivated, more exact “borders” between the earth-shrine parishes had to be 
defined, usually according to which earth priest had given a person the 
permission to cultivate or build.10  
My argument concerning the international border is that it was first 
perceived in the accustomed way as a buffer zone. Interestingly, even the 
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European boundary commissions made concessions to such local concepts. 
Their use of trees or small streams as boundary markers11 was also the 
established practice of hunters. In some places, the border deviated from the 
11th parallel in order to take account of features of the landscape and to avoid 
cutting through a settlement. As long as the local population ignored the 
border in land matters, its exact lineal course was not of great importance. But 
in the recent conflict in Kyetuu, the border is being used as an argument, and 
people have become more aware of the importance of its exact course. That 
this course was altered during the 1973 demarcation exercise, in an attempt to 
correct its deviation from the 11th parallel, has certainly fuelled the conflicts 
mentioned above. But before I enter into the contested land-related discourses, 
let me briefly sketch the settlement history of Kyetuu. 
The peopling of Kyetuu 
It is not clear whether the first Sisala settled in Kyetuu before or during the 
Zaberma slave-raids of the 1870s and 1880s. All interview partners agreed, 
however, that the Kyetuu Sisala had established their own earth shrine well 
before the turn of the century. When the Anglo-French border was drawn up, 
they found their compounds on French territory while much of their farmland 
and their holy hill was part of British territory.12
The first Dagara to settle in Kyetuu – two Kpagnyaane brothers, Kuuzie 
and Domepuo – arrived in 1926, in search of fertile farms and, more 
importantly, in fleeing from taxes and forced labour in the French colony. 
Kuuzie had met the Kyetuu Sisala at the Niégo market, and their friendship 
prepared the way for the allocation of a large piece of Kyetuu land to him. 
Later, Kuuzie invited a number of arbile, mother’s brothers, and their families 
from Niégo to join him in his new abode. The Sisala settled them on their 
lands in the British colony. Kuuzie’s and his relatives’ trans-border migration 
was not unusual. From the 1920s onwards, an increasing number of Dagara 
fled into British territory, particularly from the Niégo district, where a Dagara 
big man called Denyuu – later to become the official chef de canton for the 
Dagara east of the Volta – had established a harsh regime in the name of 
French colonial rule. The Kyetuu Sisala, on the other hand, had their own 
reasons for settling Dagara immigrants on their British lands. After the 1925 
census of the value of cross-border properties they must have feared losing 
access to these fields. Giving them out to strangers guaranteed some source of 
income in the form of gifts after the harvest and at funerals and other ritual 
occasions. There is considerable disagreement, however, between the 
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descendants of Kuuzie and the Sisala who gave the land, as to the exact terms 
of their transaction. The Dagara insist that, in exchange for 16,800 cowries, 
seven fowls, a sheep and a goat, they received not only the land, but also a 
stone from the Sisala earth shrine, thus acquiring the right to settle later 
immigrants, construct houses and bury their dead without consulting the Sisala 
further. The Sisala, on the other hand, maintain that they neither received nor 
demanded more than symbolic gifts from the Dagara, insignificant in 
economic terms, and never gave them an earth-shrine stone. 
In 1929 a second group of Dagara to Kyetuu came, under the leadership of 
Nyour, a clanbrother (Tambiile) of Kuuzie, and through Kuuzie’s intervention 
they too were given land on the British side of the border. The small stream 
which separates Nyour’s section from Kuuzie’s also serves as the 
administrative boundary between Lawra (today, Jirapa-Lambussie) and Tumu 
Districts and between the two Sisala paramount chiefdoms of Lambussie and 
Zini. 
A third group of Dagara, led by Tuole, of the Kpiele patriclan, arrived from 
Niégo in 1930, in fleeing from Denyuu’s harsh rule, and were settled near 
Nyour. Like Kuuzie, Tuole had made friends among the Kyetuu Sisala on the 
Niégo market, and because he spoke Sisale, the earth priests asked him to act 
as their intermediary for all land-related matters concerning Nyour’s and his 
own section. Later, the Sisala chief of Bangwon – the neighbouring Sisala 
village on British territory – also appointed Tuole as headman, who was to 
follow the Lambussie paramount chief through Bangwon. Again, Nyour’s and 
Tuole’s descendants insist that they gave the Kyetuu landlords 50,000 and 
30,000 cowries respectively, seven fowls each and a goat, as well as a Dagara 
smock, while the Sisala claim that they received nothing. There is agreement, 
however, that neither Nyour nor Tuole were given an earth-shrine stone. But 
while Nyour’s family has to ask the Sisala for permission to hold funerals, 
Tuole received the right to go ahead and bury his dead and settle later-coming 
immigrants. The contested nature of the settlement history (the first-comers 
were not recognised as the political representatives of the group) is reflected in 
the competition between the descendants of Tuole and Nyour over the place 
name, whether to call the whole section Tuolegang or to retain Nyourgang at 
least as distinctive sectional name.  
When the last group of Dagara arrived towards the end of the 1930s, 
Kyetuu lands on British territory were no longer large enough to accomodate 
them. Uukyor and his family – clan-mates of Tuole – were therefore settled on 
the French side of the border, not far from the Sisala compounds. Uukyor was 
later joined by a related Kusiele family, who also could not find enough space 
to settle in Tuolegang, and by a Bekuone friend. The Sisala made Uukyor the 
spokesman for the Dagara on the French side of the border, responsible for the 
allocation of land in his section and other internal matters. Uukyor’s 
descendants and the Sisala agree that Uuykor did not give anything substantial 
in exchange for their land but only two fowls, flour and a calabash in order to 
perform the necessary sacrifices before the first cultivation of the land.    484 
 The Dagara insist, however, that Uukyor later presented gifts to the Sisala in 
exchange for the right to bury the placenta and dead children. 
Today, the Dagara of Kyetuu by far outnumber the Sisala, who live 
exclusively in the Burkina Faso section of the village. Administratively, 
Kyetuu straddles two states and three districts: Kyetuu “centre” and 
Uukyorgang belong to the Département Bourra in the Sissili province of 
Burkina Faso, while Kuuziegang and Tuolegang (plus Nyourgang) in Ghana 
belong to the Tumu and Lawra (since 1988 Jirapa-Lambussie) Districts, 
respectively. As regards the chieftaincy, Kuuziegang’s Dagara headman is 
under the authority of the Fielmuo Naa, who in turn follows the Sisala 
paramount chief of Zini, while Tuolegang is responsible to the Sisala chief of 
Bangwon, which is part of the Sisala paramount chiefdom of Lambussie. 
The population of Kyetuu (Burkina Faso and Ghana) 
Sections of Kyetuu  Political allegiance Inhabitants  Houses 
(1999) 
 
Ethnic group / 
patriclans 
Burkina Faso:        
Kyetuu  Département Bourra     1996 census:       5  Sisala 
Uukyorgang  Département Bourra      684     21  Dagara houses: 
13 Kpiele  
 3 Kusiele 
 3 Bekuone 
 2 Kpagnyaane 
 
Ghana:        
Kuuziegang  Tumu District     1984 census: 
    352 
   28  Dagara houses: 
 3 Kpiele 
10 Kusiele 
 3 Bekuone 
10 Tambiile 
 
Tuolegang  Jirapa-Lambussie District        ?                  26  Dagara houses: 
18 Kpagnyaane 
 5 Birifuole 
 3 Kuwere 
 1 Benyine 
 1 Gbaane 
Politically, then, Kyetuu has never been united. This is reflected in the fact 
that no official meetings at which all the inhabitants of Kyetuu are present are 
ever held, not even among the Ghanaian sections of the village. No communal 
labour is undertaken jointly by all sections. Nor are the Dagara regularly 
invited to the annual sacrifices at the Sisala earth shrine. However, kinship and 
friendship networks are dense, and villagers from both sides of the border 
attend the market in Kyetuu-Baper and each other’s funerals. Because of these 
day-to-day interactions and the multiply interlinked settlement histories of the 
different clans, there is a shared sentiment of belonging to a common locality.   485
Before returning to the fishpond conflict, I wish to underline three aspects of 
the settlement history: 
•  First, the international border has been an important factor in the 
establishment of the Dagara. Through the various demarcation exercises, 
and because the British District Commissioners responsible for the 
maintenance of the international border made the local chiefs accompany 
them on their tours of inspection along the border, its course was fairly 
well known by the 1920s.13 For the Sisala, giving out their Gold Coast 
lands to the Dagara immigrants may have been partly due to the customary 
Sisala practice of settling strangers at some distance from their own 
compounds, and partly a strategy to avoid the potential difficulties of cross-
border agricultural activities. The Dagara immigrants who came from the 
French colony consciously used the border as protection against the 
impositions of French colonial rule. In the 1930s, even the Sisala earth-
priest family left their houses on the French side of the border and for a 
number of years sought shelter with Tuole’s family. 
•  Secondly, whether the whole of old Kyetuu is still to be considered a single 
earth-shrine parish is a contested issue. Kuuziegang, the oldest Dagara 
section, insists that they have bought their own shrine. The Sisala deny this 
but can do little to force Kuuziegang to respect their ritual authority. 
Tuolegang and Uukyorgang, on the other hand, in principle still accept that 
the Sisala are the legitimate landowners and earth priests. The four Dagara 
sections differ in their rights and obligations vis-à-vis the Sisala because 
the precise terms of their settlement were negotiated with the individual 
owners of the land in question. But in addition, these specific arrangements 
are open to different interpretations – which the fishpond conflict brought 
into the open. 
•  Thirdly, although as regards population the Dagara constitute the majority 
in Kyetuu and many neighbouring villages, local political control has 
always remained in the hands of the land-owning Sisala, on both sides of 
the border and during both the colonial and post-colonial periods. In the 
colonial period, the leaders of the immigrant Dagara in Sisala-owned areas 
were never promoted beyond the status of headmen, in neither the French 
or British colony: the positions of substantial chiefs were reserved for the 
Sisala. In post-colonial systems of local government, too, the Dagara were 
either not represented at all – as in Burkina Faso where the Kyetuu Sisala 
did not accept a Dagara RAV (Responsable Administratif du Village), – or 
prevented from acquiring positions beyond that of a simple village 
representative in the District Assembly. Politically, the Sisala play on their 
position as first-comers and original landowners, and the younger Dagara 
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particularly are beginning to resent their “discrimination” – a development 
which also plays an important role in the fishpond conflict. 
The fishpond conflict 
The controversial fishpond is situated in Tuolegang, or, to be precise, between 
Tuolegang and the Sisala section of Kyetuu (see map 2). In addition to 
providing fish and being a water source for humans and animals, the pond also 
has ritual importance for the Sisala. It was the pond that made the Sisala 
hunter who is believed to have founded Kyetuu decide to settle there. The 
crocodiles it used to accomodate were regarded as holy animals with a special 
connection to the Sisala. Some thirty years ago, however, some Muslim Wala 
traders from Fielmuo and Hamile are said to have hunted the crocodiles and 
sold their skin, meat and bones at a good profit. As a consequence, so the local 
population believes, the crocodiles disappeared and the pond dried up during 
the dry season. That the Sisala earth priests no longer performed their 
sacrifices at the pond as diligently as before is also said to have contributed to 
the “spoiling” of the pond. Ten years ago, however, Sisala earth priests paid a 
contractor working on the Fielmuo–Hamile road to come with his heavy 
equipment and dig out the pond. However, the question of who organised and 
paid for the improvement of the pond is somewhat controversial. The Sisala 
earth priests were reluctant to admit any Dagara contribution to the 
improvements, while the Dagara young men insisted that it was their initiative 
– an argument clearly designed to strengthen their claims to use the pond’s 
resources. Despite some remaining doubts, it is clear that, for reasons of 
accessability, the pond could only have been dug out by machinery brought in 
from the Ghanaian side; thus the inhabitants of Tuolegang must have played 
an important part. In any case, ever since the improvements were made, the 
pond has contained water and plentiful fish throughout the year. 
Before 1973, the pond marked the boundary and thus belonged to both 
Burkina Faso and Ghana; the new border demarcation assigned it to Ghanaian 
territory. However, this becomes an argument only for those who challenge 
the traditional foundations of land and fishing rights. Traditionally, the yearly 
communal fishing activity used to be organised by the Sisala earth priests. 
When the marshy valley was dry enough to allow access to the deeper pools of 
water which contained the fish, they fixed a date and invited the inhabitants of 
all sections in Kyetuu to come and fish, after the necessary sacrifices had been 
performed. The catch was divided into three parts, one part belonging to the 
earth priests, the other two parts being distributed among the participants in 
the fishing activity. 
Outside this communal fishing, which was carried out using baskets, 
individual fishing with rod and line was tolerated as long as the catch was 
small. Conflicts over individual versus collective fishing and over fishing   487
methods arose only after the pond had been dug out and the fish became 
plentiful.14 The young Dagara men took to fishing outside the fixed season and 
with large, fine-meshed nets – a much more efficient method to which the 
Sisala object, because of a taboo, as some say, or simply because they cannot 
afford to buy nets, as others explain. In any case, the new method can quickly 
deplete the number of fish and interrupt their regular reproduction. In addition, 
the Sisala are vexed because the Dagara young men do not give any share of 
their catch to the earth priests, and they complain that the Dagara Christians 
ridicule their sacrificial activities at the pond. 
However, there is little the earth priests can do to prevent the Dagara young 
men – who, according to my Sisala interlocutors, evidently fear no 
supernatural sanctions – from fishing. Whether the fishermen are protected by 
their Christian faith or by magical devices against the wrath of the water 
spirits, also remains an object of speculation among the Dagara elders, who try 
in vain to control their youths. 
The conflict came to a head when a young Dagara engaged a Sisala in a 
fight at the pond, injuring him badly. The Sisala young men threatened to 
retaliate, and the Dagara are said to have pointed guns at the Sisala, shouting 
that the pond was part of Ghana and that the Sisala, as Burkinabé, had no right 
to trespass on “Ghanaian territory”. The Tuolegang Dagara headman and the 
Sisala earth priests called on the chief of Bangwon and the paramount chief of 
Lambussie. The latter insisted that, even if the pond was on Ghanaian 
territory, the Dagara had no right whatsoever to take matters concerning the 
international border into their own hands. The Lambussie chief suggested, 
however, that, in order to avoid future trouble, the Kyetuu earth priests should 
transfer all traditional rights and obligations for their Ghanaian lands to the 
Sisala earth priests of Bangwon, a village neighbouring Tuolegang. This 
transfer was formally effected during a large meeting in the summer of 1998, 
where it was diplomatically agreed that the pond was a communal resource to 
be used diligently by all and that nobody should start fishing before the 
Bangwon Kuoro had given the go-ahead. The fact that on the Burkina Faso 
side of the border the earth priests appear as the major actors in the conflict, 
while in Ghana the chiefs intervene in land matters, is due to differences in the 
colonial and post-colonial development of the chieftaincy. In Burkina Faso, in 
the course of Sankara’s “revolution”, the earth priests experienced a recent re-
evaluation of their role as “authentic” indigenous authorities while in Ghana 
the colonially introduced chieftaincy continues to be, albeit semi-officially, the 
most important institution of local government, called in to mediate land 
conflicts. 
Shortly after the meeting of summer 1998, the Lambussie Kuoro died. As 
an employee of the Tumu District administration, the Bangwon Kuoro was 
absent from his home village most of the time, and up to March 1999 he had 
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not yet visited the Kyetuu earth priests or the Tuolegang headman in order to 
clarify the details of the new arrangement. For some time after the 1998 
meeting nobody fished at the pond, but by the beginning of 1999, the Dagara 
young men had resumed their activities. They claim that it was the young 
Sisala themselves who had started to fish again, and that if they had waited 
until the official go-ahead was given, they would have found the pond empty. 
The Dagara elders, in turn, complained that they were not able to prevent their 
young men from fishing. Be that as it may, particularly during the Lenten 
season fish can be sold at a good profit in the markets of both sides of the 
border, and none of the young men are willing to forgo this attractive source 
of income. In February 1999, when I watched a young man fishing with a net, 
assisted by two young boys, in less than an hour he caught about two to three 
kilos of small and medium-sized catfish and some five large ones, the whole 
catch fetching up to 20,000 Ghanaian Cedis or 6,000 CFA – a sum which 
partly explains why the Tuolegang agreement has not been implemented and 
the conflict continues to simmer. 
Traditionalist, nationalist and Christian discourses on land rights  
It is not the economy of fishing, however, which interests me here but the 
arguments of the adversaries concerning boundaries and land rights. These 
arguments are closely connected with three intersecting fields of tension: first, 
inter-generational conflicts; secondly, tensions between Christians and non-
Christians; and thirdly, tensions between the Sisala and the Dagara. But before 
elaborating on these tensions and showing how they affect the debate on the 
pond, a brief remark on the relationship between land and water rights is 
necessary. As many other parts of Africa, the Black Volta region is 
characterized by a complicated system of levels of rights to natural resources. 
“Ownership” and usufructuary rights to agricultural land, pastures, 
economically exploited trees and waters (ponds, streams) do not necessarily 
coincide. It is possible, for example, to give a certain field to a “stranger” for 
cultivation, even for a lifetime, but to reserve the right to harvest the trees 
standing on that field. It is because of this differentiation of rights that the 
Sisala earth priests gave land to the Dagara immigrants but claim to have 
maintained control over the pond. 
Regarding tensions between generations, I have mentioned that the Dagara 
elders complain that the young men no longer respect their authority, but go 
ahead and fish with modern equipment without asking for permission. These 
are longstanding complaints about the diminishing control of the seniors over 
the juniors which can be found almost anywhere, particularly in areas such as 
Kyetuu, with scarce land, high rates of labour migration and thus the basis of 
early independence. In the older Dagara settlements on Sisala land, however, 
the generational position also affects the way in which the Dagara understand 
their rights and obligations vis-à-vis the Sisala. Members of the older 
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shortly after their fathers’ arrival and grew up to respect the Sisala as the 
legitimate landowners. The young Dagara, on the other hand, have been born 
in the new village and often feel that they should have the same rights to 
consider themselves tengbiir, children of the land, as their Sisala age-mates. 
Many of them are no longer willing to accept that, even more than sixty years 
after their grandfathers’ arrival, the historical configuration of “first-comers” 
and “late-comers” should still justify a distinction between “landowners” and 
“settlers”. 
This conviction is often reinforced – and partly cross-cut – by the Christian 
faith. The older non-Christian Dagara usually fear the ritual power of the land 
spirits and, by extension, of the Sisala earth priests, many of whom are also 
known to be powerful sorcerers. The Christians, on the other hand, object to 
being involved in sacrifices to the earth shrine and see themselves as protected 
by their God. Already in the early 1930s, after a series of conflicts, the Dagara 
Christians were granted their own cemetery, since when they only inform the 
Sisala of funerals and occasionally present gifts to them after the harvest – as a 
matter of politeness, as they see it, but not of obligation. The Sisala interpret 
these gifts as an expression of respect of their position as landlords. But the 
Christians feel that all Sisala and Dagara are equal before God and that 
therefore nobody should be discriminated against because of historical 
coincidences in settlement history. 
The third field of tension is that of inter-ethnic relations. As I have pointed 
out, the Dagara have become the majority of the population in many of the 
Sisala settlements of the region. But due to their early conversion to 
Christianity, many more Dagara than Sisala have had access to school 
education, and the Dagara by far outnumber the Sisala in regional 
administration and public services on both sides of the border. The Sisala tend 
to see themselves as the historical losers, discriminated against by the Dagara. 
Therefore, they cling all the more strongly to their position as landowners, 
using it to claim political control at least at the local level. In the Ghanaian 
village of Fielmuo, near Kyetuu, which is also on what was originally Sisala 
land, the Dagara insist that they received their own earth-shrine in the late 
1910s and that they regulate their own chieftaincy affairs without consulting 
the Sisala earth priests of Nimoro. In Bozo, a Sisala village with a majority of 
Dagara population, near Kyetuu on the Burkina Faso side of the border, a 
long-standing conflict over who has the right to appoint the Dagara chief (or 
representative) still remains unresolved. In all of these cases, the Sisala argue 
that their status as the original landowners implies the right to political control. 
It is with these experiences in mind that the paramount chief of Lambussie 
suggested that the Burkinabé Kyetuu earth priests should transfer their 
traditional rights over land in Ghana to their fellow Sisala in Bangwon. He 
foresaw that the international border could be used as an argument in conflicts 
over land and power. The Dagara could insist – and some of the educated 
young men did indeed make this point – that water resources on the Ghanaian 
side of the border were to be administered by the responsible body of local   490 
government, namely the Dagara-dominated Jirapa-Lambussie District 
Assembly. The only way to prevent this and to strengthen traditional land 
rights was to transfer these rights from a Burkinabé to a Ghanaian Sisala 
community. This strategy had already been applied more or less successfully 
in the 1940s and 1950s in the market town of Hamile, another cross-border 
earth-shrine parish.15
Interestingly, in the eyes of the Kyetuu earth priests it was not a transfer, 
but a mere delegation of rights to Bangwon and not a question of ethnic 
solidarity but of their specific relation with the family of the Bangwon earth 
priests and chiefs. This family is considered to be sister’s sons, tolbie, and as 
such it was collecting gifts from the Dagara of Tuolegang already, long before 
the fishpond conflict. The Kyetuu earth priests therefore regard the 1998 
agreement as a mere extension of this long-standing arrangement and expect 
their sister’s sons to continue, at least for some time, to come and present part 
of these gifts to them, the original landowners. 
The fishpond conflict thus reveals a complex interplay of land-related 
discourses, drawing on traditionalist, Christian and modern political – 
“nationalist” – arguments. The Kyetuu earth priests are most forward in their 
traditionalist line of argument, insisting that they are the first-comers and 
therefore have the right to control all land-related issues, even across the 
border. It is for this reason that they systematically deny any past Dagara 
payment for the land or for an earth shrine. The Dagara, on the other hand, are 
arguing partly within the framework of traditional land-rights when they claim 
to have received their land and certain ritual rights in exchange for substantial 
gifts. In addition, however, the young Christians particularly, but also some of 
the elders, put forward modern political arguments. First, they insist that the 
pond is on Ghanaian territory and that as Burkinabé citizens the Kyetuu earth 
priests have no rights to it. In other contexts, however, citizenship is handled 
more flexibly and unofficial dual citizenship (the holding of two ID cards etc.) 
is not unusual.16 The Dagara young men’s argument that, as Burkinabé 
citizens, the Sisala earth priests had no rights to a pond on Ghanaian territory, 
is therefore probably more a pragmatic one than the expression of a deeply felt 
nationalism.17 Secondly, they adhere to a mixture of Christian arguments and 
the revolutionary discourse of Jerry Rawlings, which demands that the land 
and all resources should belong fully to those who need and cultivate them. 
And finally, the Lambussie chief and the Ghanaian Sisala support the 
traditionalist line of argument, but also seek to come to terms with the 
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international border; they are searching for solutions in the interests of 
strengthening the position of the Sisala as a whole. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, let us look briefly at the wider implications of the Kyetuu case 
for our understanding of the making of boundaries and perceptions of space 
and land conflicts in the West African savannah. The conflict in Kyetuu is 
obviously a telling example of “legal pluralism” – of the co-existence and 
interaction of various legal and political registers on which actors draw in 
context-specific, strategical ways. In the Kyetuu case, state legislation on 
water resources and the concept of a sovereign territorial state were, at least 
implicitly, brought into play by one side, while the other insisted on the 
traditional foundations of land rights, based on the idea of spiritual provinces 
and the configuration of first-comers and late-comers. The conflict had not yet 
been brought before the “modern” political authorities, but this is an option 
which one or other side may resort to in the future.18 Until now, the 
adversaries have tried to solve the conflict within a more or less “traditional” 
framework. However, a closer examination reveals that the intervention of the 
Lambussie Kuoro is by no means as “traditional” as it first appears because 
first, chieftaincy in the area is a colonial innovation, and secondly, in pre-
colonial times neither the Bangwon nor the Lambussie chiefs would have had 
any say in the affairs of a separate earth shrine area such as Kyetuu. We are 
thus dealing with “neo-traditional” intermediary structures whose legitimacy 
is not automatic: why if not because of the “realpolitik” of political strength 
should the Kyetuu landowners accept the interference of Bangwon and 
Lambussie? These questions throw some doubt on the claims of the more 
optimistic defenders of decentralisation programmes because the legitimacy of 
empowered local structures is not always obvious. As I have pointed out, the 
Dagara immigrants have almost no political representation within this neo-
traditional system of conflict mediation; therefore, the young men see the 
democratically elected district assembly as a more legitimate representative, at 
least in principle. 
The second outstanding aspect of the Kyetuu case, which can also be found 
elsewhere, is the selective appropriation of colonial borders. In localities 
straddling the new borders, the custodians of the earth shrines usually 
continued to exercise their ritual control over land across the border. With 
respect to the system of chieftaincy, introduced in the colonial period, 
however, the local population quickly adopted the border as a resource, 
capable of protecting them from tax and forced labour. Instead of controlling 
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the movement of the population – as the colonial regimes intended – the 
borders became incentives for additional mobility. 
In transnational localities, political allegiance thus followed the lines of the 
nation-state, while strategies of land-use, and kin as well as ritual networks, 
ignored the new border. In recent times, and particularly since the last border-
demarcation exercises however, the border and related concepts of national 
citizenship are also brought to bear on land issues. In this process, the local 
population also incorporates new concepts of the border into its repertoire of 
perceptions of space. Now the border is also understood as a continuous 
dividing line, separating two contiguous territories. One might speak of the 
“digitisation” of boundaries19, leaving only the unambiguous options zero or 
one, in contrast to the traditionally more subtle shading and interlocking of 
frontiers and qualitative notions of territoriality. One of the questions that 
follows from this is whether the digitisation of space implies a digitisation of 
identities as well. Another interesting question would be to examine whether 
this new concept of lineal boundaries also affects the understanding of earth-
shrine parishes in other areas. First indications are that we are indeed 
witnessing a general hardening of boundaries, but only where the earth-shrine 
boundaries coincide with other social boundaries such as ethnic boundaries. 
Future research is required to go more deeply into these interconnections.  
List of interviews 
Ghana 
Kyetuu-Tuolegang: Kpiele Maasangyir (Tuolegang Naa) et al, 14.1.1998 and 
26.2.1999 
Kyetuu- Kuuziegang: Kpagnyaane Gyile Bagwa (Kuuziegang Naa), Kosi Debole 
(earth priest) et al, 25.2.1999 
Kyetuu-Nyourgang: Tambiile Ralio Tengdong et al, 26.2.1999 
Nimoro: Suleiman Balesemule, Bombieh Nalbe, George Bentor et al, 14.12.1997 
Fielmuo: Fielmuo Naa (Regent) Aansokung Daanikuu; Kyekole Daanikuu et al, 
14.1.1998 
Bangwon: Leke Sinu, Bangwon Kuoro Yinuroh Wiyor et al, 11.12.1997 
Burkina Faso 
Kyetuu: Sisala earth priests Niepor Kombui et al, 16.12.1997 and 22.2.1999 
Kyetuu-Uukyorgang: Kpiele Hien Yelkou; Bekuone Poda Der et al, 25.2.1999 
Hiela: Baagyawii Yelgie, Balitor Nagie, Wieduku Zalve, Anlanta Basawule, Wifele 
Bodong, Kobina Wove, 18.12.1997 
Hiela: Hiela Kuoro Enoho Yelgie, Kunyoko Yelgie, 22.2.1999 
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